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Introduction 
Knowledge would be fatal, it is the uncertainty that charms one.  A mist 
makes things beautiful. 
— Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 1891 
1.1.  Generations of control theory 
Figure 1.1.1 reproduces John Doyle’s cartoon about developments in optimal 
control theory since World War II.1  Two scientists in the upper panels use 
diﬀerent mathematical methods to devise control laws and estimators.  The 
person on the left uses classical methods (Euler equations, z -transforms, lag 
operators) and the one on the right uses modern recursive methods (Bellman 
equations, Kalman ﬁlters).  The scientists in the top panels completely trust 
their models of the transition dynamics.  The, shall we say, gentleman in the 
lower panel shares the objectives of his predecessors from the 50s, 60s, and 
70s, but regards his model as an approximation to an unknown and unspec­
iﬁed  model  that  he  thinks  actually  generates  the  data.  He  seeks  decision 
rules and estimators that work over a nondenumerable set of models near his 
approximating model.  The  H∞  in his postmodern tattoo and the  θ  on his 
staﬀ are alternative ways to express doubts about his approximating model 
by measuring the discrepancy of the true data generating mechanism from his 
approximating model. As we shall learn in later chapters, the parameter θ is 
interpretable as a penalty on a measure of discrepancy (entropy) between his 
approximating model and the model that actually generates the data.  The 
H∞  refers to the limit of his objective function as the penalty parameter  θ 
approaches a “break down point” that bounds the set of alternative models 
against which the decision maker can attain a robust decision rule. 
1.2.  Control theory and rational expectations 
Classical and modern control theory supplied perfect tools for applying Muth’s 
(1961) concept of rational expectations to a variety of problems in dynamic 
economics.  A signiﬁcant reason that rational expectations initially diﬀused 
slowly after Muth’s (1961) paper is that in 1961 few economists knew the 
tools lampooned in the top panel of ﬁgure 1.1.1.  Rational expectations took 
1  John Doyle consented to let us reproduce this drawing, which appears in Zhou, Doyle, 
and Glover (1996).  We changed Doyle’s notation by making  θ  (Doyle’s μ )t h e  f r e e  p a r a m ­
eter carried by the post-modern control theorist. 
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Figure 1.1.1:  A pictorial history of control theory (cour­
tesy of John Doyle).  Beware of a theorist bearing a free 
parameter, θ . 
hold in the 1970s only after a new generation of macroeconomists had learned 
those tools.  Ever since,  macroeconomists and rational expectations econo­
metricians have gathered inspiration and ideas from classical and recursive 
control theory.2 
When  macroeconomists were beginning  to  apply classical and modern 
control and estimation theory in the late 1970s, control theorists and applied 
mathematicians were seeking ways to relax the assumption that the decision 
maker trusts his model.  They sought new control and estimation methods 
to improve adverse outcomes that came from applying classical and modern 
control theory to a variety of engineering and physical problems. They thought 
that model misspeciﬁcation explained why actual outcomes were sometimes 
much worse than control theory had promised and therefore sought decision 
rules and estimators that acknowledged model misspeciﬁcation.  That is how 
robust control and estimation theory came to be. 
2  See  Stokey  and  Lucas  with  Prescott  (1989),  Ljungqvist  and  Sargent  (2004),  and 
Hansen and Sargent (1991) for many examples. Misspeciﬁcation and rational expectations  5 
1.3.  Misspeciﬁcation and rational expectations 
To say that model misspeciﬁcation is as much of a problem in economics as 
it is in physics and engineering is an understatement.  This book borrows, 
adapts, and extends tools from the literature on robust control and estima­
tion to model decision makers who regard their models as approximations. 
We assume that a decision maker has created an approximating model by a 
speciﬁcation search that we do not model.  The decision maker believes that 
data will come from3  an unknown member of a set of unspeciﬁed models near 
his approximating model.4  Concern about model misspeciﬁcation induces a 
decision maker to want decision rules that work over that set of nearby models. 
If they lived inside rational expectations models, decision makers would 
not  have  to  worry  about  model  misspeciﬁcation.  They  should  trust  their 
model because subjective and objective probability distributions (i.e., models) 
coincide.  Rational expectations theorizing removes agents’ personal models 
as elements of the model.5 
Although the artiﬁcial agents within a rational expectations model trust 
the model, a model’s author often doubts it, especially when calibrating it 
or after performing speciﬁcation tests.  There are several good reasons for 
wanting to extend rational expectations models to acknowledge fear of model 
misspeciﬁcation.6  First, doing so accepts Muth’s (1961) idea of putting econo­
metricians and the agents being modeled on the same footing: because econo­
metricians face speciﬁcation doubts, the agents inside the model might too.7 
Second, in various contexts, rational expectations models underpredict prices 
3  Or, in the case of the robust ﬁltering problems posed in chapter 17, have  come from. 
4  We say “unspeciﬁed” because of how these models are formed as statistical perturba­
tions to the decision maker’s approximating model. 
5  In a rational expectations model, each agent’s model (i.e., his subjective joint probabil­
ity distribution over exogenous and endogenous variables) is determined by the equilibrium. 
It is not something to be speciﬁed by the model builder.  Its early advocates in econometrics 
emphasized the empirical power that followed from the fact that the rational expectations 
hypothesis eliminates all free parameters associated with people’s beliefs. For example, see 
Hansen and Sargent (1980) and Sargent (1981). 
6  In chapter 16, we explore several mappings, the ﬁxed points of which restrict a robust 
decision maker’s approximating model.  As is usually the case with rational expectations 
models,  we  are  silent  about  the  process  by  which  an  agent  arrives  at  an  approximating 
model.  A qualiﬁcation to the claim that rational expectations models do not describe the 
process by which agents form their models comes from the literature on adaptive learning. 
There,  agents  who use recursive least squares learning schemes  eventually  come to  know 
enough to behave as they should in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium.  Early examples of such 
work are Bray (1982),  Marcet and Sargent (1989),  and Woodford (1990).  See Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001) for new results. 
7  This argument  might oﬀend  someone  with a preference against  justifying modeling 
assumptions on behavioral grounds. 6  Introduction 
of risk from asset market data.  For example, relative to standard rational 
expectations models, actual asset markets seem to assign prices to macroeco­
nomic risks that are too high. The equity premium puzzle is one manifestation 
of this mispricing.8  Agents’ caution in responding to concerns about model 
misspeciﬁcation can raise prices assigned to macroeconomicr i s k s  a n d  l e a d  t o 
reinterpreting them as compensation for bearing model uncertainty instead of 
risks with known probability distributions.  This reason for studying robust 
decisions is positive and is to be judged by how it helps explain market data. 
A third reason for studying the robustness of decision rules to model misspeci­
ﬁcation is normative. A long tradition dating back to Friedman (1953), Bailey 
(1971), Brainard (1967), and Sims (1971, 1972) advocates framing macroe­
conomic policy rules and interpreting econometric ﬁndings in light of doubts 
about model speciﬁcation, though how those doubts have been formalized in 
practice has varied.9 
1.4.  Our extensions of robust control theory 
Among ways we adapt and extend robust control theory so that it can be 
applied to economic problems, six important ones are discounting; a reinter­
pretation of the “worst-case shock process”; extensions to several multi-agent 
settings; stochastic interpretations of perturbations to models; a way of cali­
brating plausible fears of model misspeciﬁcation as measured by the parameter 
θ in ﬁgure 1.1.1; and formulations of robust estimation and ﬁltering problems. 
1.4.1. Discounting 
Most presentations of robustness in control theory treat undiscounted prob­
lems,  and  the  few  formulations  of  discounting  that  do  appear  diﬀer  from 
the way economists would set things up.10  In this book, we formulate dis­
counted problems that preserve the recursive structure of decision problems 
that macroeconomists and other applied economists use so widely. 
8  A related  ﬁnding  is that  rational  expectations  models impute low costs  to  business 
cycles.  See Hansen, Sargent,  and Tallarini (1999),  Tallarini (2000),  and Alvarez and Jer­
mann  (2004).  Barillas,  Hansen,  and  Sargent  (2007)  argue  that  Tallarini’s  and  Alvarez 
and Jermann’s measures of the costs of reducing aggregate ﬂuctuations are ﬂawed if what 
they  measure as a market price of risk is instead  interpreted  as a market  price of  model 
uncertainty. 
9  We suspect that his doubts about having a properly speciﬁed macroeconomic model 
explains  why,  when  he  formulated comprehensive  proposals  for  the  conduct  of  monetary 
and  ﬁscal  policy,  Friedman  (1953,  1959)  did  not  use  a  formal Bayesian  expected  utility 
framework, like the one he had used in Friedman and Savage (1948). 
10  Compare the formulations in Whittle (1990) and Hansen and Sargent (1995). Our extensions of robust control theory  7 
1.4.2. Representation of worst-case shock 
As we shall see, in existing formulations of robust control theory, shocks that 
represent misspeciﬁcation are allowed to feed back on endogenous state vari­
ables  that  are inﬂuenced  by  the decision  maker,  an  outcome that in  some 
contexts appears to confront the decision maker with peculiar incentives to 
manipulate  future  values  of  some  of  those  shocks  by  adjusting  his  current 
decisions.  Some economists11  have questioned the plausibility of the notion 
that the  decision maker is concerned about any  misspeciﬁcations that can 
be represented in terms of shocks that feed back on state variables under his 
partial control.  In chapter 7,  we use the “Big  K ,  little  k  trick” from the 
literature on recursive competitive equilibria to reformulate misspeciﬁcation 
perturbations to an approximating model as exogenous processes that cannot 
be inﬂuenced by the decision maker.  As we illustrate in the analysis of the 
permanent income model of chapter 10, this reinterpretation of the worst-case 
shock process is useful in a variety of economic models. 
1.4.3. Multiple agent settings 
In formulations from the control theory literature, the decision maker’s model 
of the state transition dynamics is a primitive part of (i.e., an exogenous input 
into) the statement of the problem.  In multi-agent dynamic economic prob­
lems, it is not. Instead, parts of the decision maker’s transition law governing 
endogenous state variables, such as aggregate capital stocks, are aﬀected by 
other agents’ choices and therefore are equilibrium outcomes. In this book, we 
describe ways of formulating the decision maker’s approximating model when 
he and possibly other decision makers are concerned about model misspeciﬁca­
tion, perhaps to diﬀering extents. We impose a common approximating model 
on all decision makers, but allow them to express diﬀerent degrees of mistrust 
of that model and to have diﬀerent objectives. As we explain in chapters 12, 
15, and 16, this is a methodologically conservative approach that adapts the 
concept of a Nash equilibrium to incorporate concerns about robustness. The 
hypothesis of a common approximating model preserves much of the disci­
pline of rational expectations, while the hypothesis that agents have diﬀerent 
interests and diﬀerent concerns about robustness implies a precise sense in 
which ex post they behave as if they had diﬀerent models. We thereby attain 
a disciplined way of modeling apparent heterogeneity of beliefs.12 
11  For example, Christopher Sims expressed this view to us. 
12  Brock and deFontnouvelle (2000) describe a related approach to modeling heterogene­
ity of beliefs. 8  Introduction 
1.4.4. Explicitly stochastic interpretations 
Much of this book is about linear-quadratic problems for which a convenient 
certainty equivalence result described in chapter 2 permits easy transitions be­
tween nonstochastic and stochastic versions of a problem. Chapter 3 describes 
the relationship between stochastic and nonstochastic setups. 
1.4.5. Calibrating fear of misspeciﬁcation 
Rational expectations models presume that decision makers know the correct 
model, a probability distribution over sequences of outcomes. One way to jus­
tify this assumption is to appeal to adaptive theories of learning that endow 
agents with very long histories of data and allow a Law of Large Numbers to 
do its work.13  But after observing a short time series, a statistical learning 
process will typically leave agents undecided among members of a set of mod­
els, perhaps indexed by parameters that the data have not yet pinned down 
well.  This observation is the starting point for the way that we use detec­
tion error probabilities to discipline the amount of model uncertainty that a 
decision maker fears after having studied a data set of length T . 
1.4.6. Robust ﬁltering and estimation 
Chapter  17 describes  a  formulation of some  robust ﬁltering  problems  that 
closely resemble problems in the robust control literature.  This formulation 
is interesting in its own right,  both economically and mathematically.  For 
one thing,  it has the useful property of being  the dual of a robust control 
problem.  However, as we discuss in detail in chapter 17, this problem builds 
in a peculiar form of commitment to model distortions that had been chosen 
earlier but that one may not want to consider when making current decisions. 
For  that  reason,  in  chapter  18,  we  describe  a  class  of  robust  ﬁltering  and 
estimation  problems  without  commitment  to  those prior  distortions.  Here 
the decision maker carries along the density of the hidden states given the 
past signal history computed under the approximating model, then considers 
hypothetical  changes in this  density  and in  the  state  and signal dynamics 
looking forward. 
13  For  example,  see  work  summarized  by  Fudenberg  and  Levine  (1998),  Evans  and 
Honkapohja (2001), and Sargent (1999a).  The justiﬁcation is incomplete because economies 
where agents use adaptive learning schemes typically converge to self-conﬁrming equilibria, 
not necessarily to full rational expectations equilibria. They may fail to converge to rational 
expectations equilibria because histories can contain an insuﬃcient number of observations 
about oﬀ-equilibrium-path events for a Law of Large Numbers to be capable of eradicating 
erroneous  beliefs.  See  Cho and Sargent  (2007)  for a brief introduction  to  self-conﬁrming 
equilibria and Sargent (1999a) for a macroeconomic application. Entropy in speciﬁcation analysis	 9 
1.5.	 Robust control theory, shock serial correlations, 
and rational expectations 
Ordinary optimal control theory assumes that decision makers know a 
transition law  linking  the  motion  of state  variables to  controls.  The  opti­
mization problem associates a distinct decision rule with each speciﬁcation 
of shock processes.  Many aspects of rational expectations models stem from 
this association.14  For example, the Lucas critique (1976) is an application of 
the ﬁnding that, under rational expectations, decision rules are functionals of 
the serial correlations of shocks. Rational expectations econometrics achieves 
parameter identiﬁcation by exploiting the structure of the function that maps 
shock serial correlation properties to decision rules.15 
Robust control theory alters the mapping from shock temporal properties 
to decision rules by treating the decision maker’s model as an approximation 
and seeking a single rule to use for a set of vaguely speciﬁed alternative models 
expressed in terms of distortions to the shock processes in the approximating 
model. Because they are allowed to feed back arbitrarily on the history of the 
states, such distortions can represent misspeciﬁed dynamics. 
As emphasized by Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1981, 1991), the economet­
ric content of the rational expectations hypothesis is a set of cross-equation 
restrictions that cause decision rules to be functions of parameters that char­
acterize the stochastic processes impinging on agents’ constraints. A concern 
for model misspeciﬁcation alters these cross-equation restrictions by inspir­
ing the robust decision maker to act as if he had beliefs that seem to twist 
or slant  probabilities in ways designed to make his decision rule less fragile 
to misspeciﬁcation.  Formulas presented in chapters 2 and 7 imply that the 
Hansen-Sargent (1980,  1981)  formulas  for  those  cross-equation restrictions 
also describe the behavior of the robust decision maker, provided that we use 
appropriately slanted laws of motion in the Hansen-Sargent (1980) forecasting 
formulas. This ﬁnding shows how robust control theory adds a concern about 
misspeciﬁcation in a way that preserves the econometric discipline imposed 
by rational expectations econometrics. 
1.6.	 Entropy in speciﬁcation analysis 
The statistical and econometric literatures on model misspeciﬁcation supply 
tools for measuring discrepancies between models and for thinking about de­
cision making in the presence of model misspeciﬁcation. 
14  Stokey and Lucas with Prescott (1989) is a standard reference on using control theory 
to construct dynamic models in macroeconomics. 
15  See Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1981, 1991).   
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Where  y  ∗  denotes  next  period’s  state vector,  let  the  data  truly  come 
from a Markov process with one step transition density  f(y  ∗|y)t h a t  w e  a s ­
sume  has  invariant  distribution  μ(y).  Let  the  econometrician’s  model  be 
fα(y  ∗|y)w h e r e  α  ∈  A  and  A  is  a compact set of values  for a parameter 
vector  α.  If there is no  α ∈ A  such that  fα  = f , we say that the econo­
metrician’s model is misspeciﬁed.  Assume that the econometrician estimates 
α  by maximum likelihood.  Under some regularity conditions, the maximum 
likelihood estimator α ˆo  converges in large samples to16 
plim ˆ αo =a r g m i n α∈A  I (fα,f)(y) dμ(y)  ( 1 .6.1) 
where I(fα,f)(y) is the conditional relative entropy of model f  with respect 
to model fα , deﬁned as the expected value of the logarithm of the likelihood 
ratio evaluated with respect to the true conditional density f(y  ∗|y) 

















∗ |y) dy  .  (1.6.2) 
It  can  be  shown  that  I(fα,f)(y)  ≥  0.  Figure  1.6.1  depicts  how  the 
probability limit  ˆ αo  of the estimator of the parameters of a misspeciﬁed model 
makes I(fα,f)=  I(fα,f)(y)dμ(y) as small as possible. When the model is 
misspeciﬁed, the minimized value of I(fα,f) is positive. 
A 




Figure  1.6.1:  Econometric speciﬁcation  analysis.  Sup­
pose that the data generating mechanism is f  and that the 
econometrician ﬁts a parametric class of models fα ∈ A to 
the data and that  f/ ∈ A.  Maximum likelihood estimates 
of  α  eventually select the misspeciﬁed model  fαo  that is 
closest to f  as measured by entropy I(fα,f). 
Sims (1993) and Hansen and Sargent (1993) have used this framework to 
deduce the consequences of various types of misspeciﬁcation for estimates of 
16  Versions of this result occur in White (1982, 1994), Vuong (1989), Sims (1993), Hansen 
and Sargent (1993), and Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995).   
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parameters of dynamic stochastic models.17  For example, they studied the 
consequences of using seasonally adjusted data to estimate models populated 
by decision makers who actually base their decisions on seasonally unadjusted 
data. 
1.7.  Acknowledging misspeciﬁcation 
To study decision making in the presence of model misspeciﬁcation, we turn 
the analysis of section 1.6 on its head by taking  fαo  as a given approximat­
ing model and surrounding it with a set of unknown possible data generating 
processes, one unknown element of which is the true process  f .  See ﬁgure 
1.7.1.  Because he doesn’t know  f , a decision maker bases his decisions on 
the  only explicitly speciﬁed  model available,  namely,  the misspeciﬁed  fαo . 
We are silent about the process through which the decision maker discovered 
his approximating model fαo (y  ∗|y).18  We also take for granted the decision 
maker’s parameter estimates αo .  19  We impute some doubts about his model 
to the decision maker.  In particular, the decision maker suspects that the 
data are actually generated by another model  f(y  ∗|y)  with relative entropy 
I(fαo ,f)(y).  The decision maker thinks that his model is a good approxi­
mation in the  sense that  I(fαo ,f)(y)  is not too large, and wants to make 
decisions that will be good when  f    fαo .  We endow the decision maker  = 
with a discount factor  β  and construct the following intertemporal measure 
of model misspeciﬁcation:20 
∞
I (fαo ,f)=  Ef  βtI (fαo ,f)(yt) 
t=0 
where Ef  is the mathematical expectation evaluated with respect to the dis­
tribution  f .  Our decision maker confronts model misspeciﬁcation by seek­
ing  a  decision  rule  that  will  work  well  across  a  set  of  models  for  which 
I(fαo ,f)  ≤  η0 ,w h e r e  η0  measures  the  set  of  models  F  surrounding  his 
approximating model fα .  Figure 1.7.1 portrays the decision maker’s view of 
the world. The decision maker wants a single decision rule that is reliable for 
all models f  in the set displayed in ﬁgure 1.7.1.21  This book describes how he 
17  Also see Vuong (1989). 
18  See  Kreps (1988,  chapter  11)  for  an  interesting  discussion of  the  problem  of  model 
discovery. 
19  In chapter  9, we entertain the hypothesis that the decision maker has estimated his 
model by maximum likelihood using a data set of length T  and use Bayesian detection error 
probabilities to guide the choice of a set of models against which he wants to be robust. 
20  Hansen  and  Sargent  (2005b,  2007a)  provide  an  extensive  discussion  of  reasons  for 
adopting this measure of model misspeciﬁcation. 
21  ‘Reliable’ means good enough, but not necessary optimal, for each member of a set of 12  Introduction 
can form such a robust decision rule by solving a Bellman equation that tells 
him how to maximize his intertemporal objective over decision rules when a 
hypothetical malevolent nature minimizes that same objective by choosing a 
model  f .  22  That is, we use a max-min decision rule.  Positing a malevolent 
nature is just a device that the decision maker uses to perform a systematic 
analysis of the fragility of alternative decision rules and to construct a lower 
bound on the performance that can be attained by using them.  A decision 
maker who is concerned about robustness naturally seeks to construct bounds 
on the performance of potential decision rules, and the malevolent agent helps 






I(fαo ,f) ≤ η 
Figure 1.7.1:  Robust decision making: A decision maker 
with model  fαo  suspects that the data are actually gener­
ated by a nearby model f ,w h e r e  I(fαo ,f) ≤ η. 
1.8.  Why entropy? 
To assess the robustness of a decision rule to misspeciﬁcation of an approx­
imating model requires a way to measure just how good an approximation 
that model is.  In this book, we use the relative entropy to measure discrep­
ancies between models.  Of course, relative entropy is not the only way we 
models.  The Lucas critique, or dynamic programming, tells us that it is impossible to ﬁnd 
a single decision rule that is optimal for all f  in this set.  Note how the one-to-one mapping 
from transition laws  f  to decision rules that is emphasized in the Lucas critique depends 
on the decision maker knowing the model  f .  We shall provide a Bayesian interpretation 
of a robust decision rule by noting that, ex post, the max-min decision rule is optimal for 
some  model within the set of models. 
22  See Milnor (1951, 1954) for an early formal use of the ﬁction of a malevolent agent.          
13  Why entropy? 
could measure discrepancies between alternative probability distributions.23 
But in using relative entropy, we follow a substantial body of work in applied 
mathematics  that  reaps  beneﬁts  from  entropy  in  terms  of  tractability  and 
interpretability.  In particular, using entropy to measure model discrepancies 
enables us to appeal to the following outcomes: 
1.	 In the general nonlinear case, using entropy to measure model discrepan­
cies means that concerns about model misspeciﬁcation can be represented 
in terms of a continuation value function that emerges as the indirect util­
ity function after minimizing the decision maker’s continuation value with 
respect to the transition density, subject to a penalty on the size of con­
ditional entropy. That indirect utility function implies a tractable “risk-
sensitivity” adjustment to continuation values in Bellman equations.  In 
particular,  we  can  represent  a  concern  about  robustness  by  replacing 
EtV (xt+1) in a Bellman equation with −θ log Et  exp 
−V (
θ
xt+1)  ,w h e r e 
θ>θ  > 0  is a parameter that measures the decision maker’s concern 
about robustness to misspeciﬁcation.  (We shall relate the lower bound 
θ  to  H∞  control theory in chapter 8.)  The simple  log Et exp  form of 
this adjustment follows from the decision to measure model discrepancy 
in terms of entropy. 
2.	 In problems with quadratic objective functions and linear transition laws, 
using relative entropy to measure model misspeciﬁcation leads to a sim­
ple adjustment to the ordinary linear-quadratic dynamic programming 
problem.  Suppose  that  the  transition  law  for  the  state  vector  in  the 
approximating model is  xt+1  = Axt + But + C t+1 ,w h e r e   t+1  is an 
i.i.d.  Gaussian vector process with mean 0 and identity covariance. Us­
ing relative entropy to measure discrepancies in transition laws implies 
a worst-case model that perturbs the distribution of   t+1  by enhancing 
its covariance matrix and appending a mean vector  wt+1  that depends 
on date t information.  Value functions remain quadratic and the distri­
bution associated with the perturbed model remains normal.  Because a 
form of certainty equivalence prevails,24  it is suﬃcient to keep track of 
the mean distortion when solving the control problem. This mean distor­
tion contributes .5wt+1 ·wt+1  to the relative entropy discrepancy between 
the approximating model and the alternative model.  As a consequence, 
at e r m  θwt
  
+1wt+1  is appended to the one-period return function when 
computing the robust control and a worst-case conditional mean. 
23  Bergemann and Schlag (2005) use Prohorov distance rather than entropy to deﬁne the 
set of probability models against which decision makers seek robustness. 
24  See page 33. 14  Introduction 
3.  As we shall see in chapter 9, entropy connects to a statistical theory for 
discriminating one model from another.  The theory of large deviations 
mentioned in chapter 3 links statistical discrimination to a risk-sensitivity 
adjustment.25 
1.9.  Why max-min? 
We answer this question by posing three other questions. 
1.  What does it mean for a decision rule to be robust?  A robust decision 
rule performs well under the variety of probability models depicted in 
ﬁgure 1.7.1.  How might one go about investigating the implications of 
alternative models for payoﬀs under a given decision rule?  A good way 
to do this is to compute a lower bound on value functions by assessing 
the worst performance of a given decision rule over a range of alternative 
models.  This  makes  max-min a  useful  tool for  searching for  a  robust 
decision rule. 
2.  Instead of max-min, why not simply ask the decision maker to put a prior 
distribution over the set of alternative models depicted in ﬁgure 1.7.1? 
Such a prior would, in eﬀect,  have us form a new model – a so-called 
hypermodel – and thereby eliminate concerns about the misspeciﬁcation 
of that model. Forming a hypermodel would allow the decision maker to 
proceed with business as usual, albeit with what may be a more complex 
model and a computationally more demanding control problem. We agree 
that this “model averaging” approach is a good way to address some well-
structured forms of model uncertainty. Indeed, in chapter 18 we shall use 
model averaging and Bayesian updating when we study problems that call 
for combined estimation and control.  But the set of alternative models 
can be so vast that it is beyond the capacity of a decision maker to conjure 
up a unique well behaved prior. And even when he can, a decision maker 
might also want decisions to be robust to whatever prior he could imagine 
over this set of models. 
More is at issue than the choice of the prior distribution to assign to dis­
tinct well speciﬁed models.  The speciﬁcation errors that we fear might 
be more complex than can be represented with a simple model averag­
ing approach.  It is reasonable to take the view that each of the distinct 
models being averaged is itself an approximation.  The decision maker 
might lack precise ideas about how to describe the alternative speciﬁ­
cations that worry him and about how to form prior distributions over 
25  Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) extensively exploit these connections. Is max-min too cautious?	 15 
them.  Perhaps he can’t articulate the misspeciﬁcations that he fears, or 
perhaps the set of alternative models is too big to comprehend.26 
Our answer to this second question naturally leads to a reconsideration 
of the standard justiﬁcation for being a Bayesian. 
3.  “Why be a Bayesian?”	 Savage (1954) gave an authoritative answer by 
describing axioms that imply that a rational person can express all of his 
uncertainty in terms of a unique prior.  However, Schmeidler (1989) and 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) altered one of Savage’s axioms to produce 
a model of what it means to be a rational decision maker that diﬀers 
from Savage’s Bayesian model. Gilboa and Schmeidler’s rational decision 
maker  has  multiple  priors and  behaves as  a  max-min expected  utility 
decision maker:  the decision maker maximizes and assumes that nature 
chooses a probability to minimize  his expected utility.  We are free to 
appeal to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s axioms to rationalize the form of max­
min  expected  utility  decision  making  embedded  in  the  robust  control 
theories that we study in this book.27 
1.10.  Is max-min too cautious? 
Our doubts are traitors, And make us lose the good we oft might win, By 
fearing to attempt. 
— William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, act 1 scene 4 
Our use of the detection error probabilities of chapter 9 to restrict the penalty 
parameter  θ  in ﬁgure 1.1.1 protects us against the objection that the max­
min expected utility theory embedded in robust control theory is too cautious 
because, by acting as if he believed the worst-case model, the decision maker 
puts too much weight on a “very unlikely” scenario.28  We  choose  θ  so that 
the entropy ball that surrounds the decision maker’s approximating model in 
26  See  Sims (1971)  and  Diaconis and  Freedman  (1986)  for arguments  that  forming an 
appropriate prior is diﬃcult when the space of submodels and the dimensions of parameter 
spaces are very large. 
27  Hansen  and  Sargent  (2001)  and  Hansen,  Sargent,  Turmuhambetova,  and  Williams 
(2006)  describe  how  stochastic  formulations  of  robust  control  “constraint  problems”  can 
be viewed in terms of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s max-min expected utility model.  Interest­
ing theoretical work on model ambiguity not explicitly connected to robust control theory 
includes  Dow  and  Werlang  (1994),  Ghirardato  and  Marinacci  (2002),  Ghirardato,  Mac­
cheroni, and Marinacci (2004), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003), 
and Rigotti and Shannon (2003, 2005), and Strzalecki (2007). 
28  Bewley (1986, 1987, 1988), Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004), Rigotti and Shannon 
(2005),  and Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2004) use an alternative to the max-min ex­
pected utility model but still one in which the decision maker experiences ambiguity about 
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ﬁgure 1.7.1 has the property that the perturbed models on and inside the ball 
are diﬃcult to distinguish statistically from the approximating model with 
the amount of data at hand.  This way of calibrating θ  makes the likelihood 
function for the decision maker’s worst-case model ﬁt the available data almost 
as  well  as  his  approximating  model.  Moreover,  by  inspecting  the  implied 
worst-case model, we can evaluate whether the decision maker is focusing on 
scenarios that appear to be too extreme. 
1.11.  Aren’t you just picking a plausible prior? 
By interchanging the order in which we maximize and minimize, chapter 7 de­
scribes an ex post Bayesian interpretation of a robust decision rule.29  Friendly 
critics have responded to this ﬁnding by recommending that we view robust 
control as simply a way to select a plausible prior in an otherwise standard 
Bayesian analysis.30  Furthermore, one can regard our chapter 9 detection 
error probability calculations as a way to guarantee that the prior is plausible 
in light of the historical data record at the disposal of the decision maker. 
We have no objection to this argument in principle, but warn the reader 
that issues closely related to the Lucas (1976) critique mean that it has to be 
handled with care, as in any subjectivist approach.  Imagine a policy inter­
vention that alters a component of a decision maker’s approximating model 
for, e.g., a tax rate, while leaving other components unaltered.  In general, 
all  equations of the decision maker’s worst-case transition law that emerge 
from the max-min decision process will vary with such interventions. The de­
pendence of other parts of the decision maker’s worst-case model on subcom­
ponents of the transition law for the approximating model that embody the 
policy experiment reﬂects the context-speciﬁc nature of the decision maker’s 
worst-case model.  Therefore, parts of the ex post worst-case “prior” that de­
scribe the evolution of variables not directly aﬀected by the policy experiment 
will depend on the policy experiment.  The sense in which robust control is 
just a way to pick a plausible prior is subtle. 
Another challenge related to the Lucas critique pertains when we apply 
robust control without availing ourselves of the ex post  Bayesian interpreta­
and there is a status quo allocation that plays a special role in shaping how the decision 
maker ranks outcomes.  Some advocates of this incomplete preferences approach say that 
they like it partly because it avoids what they say is an undue pessimism that characterizes 
the max-min expected utility model.  See Fudenberg and Levine (1995) for how max-min 
can be used to attain an interesting convergence result for adaptive learning. 
29  We introduce this argument because it provides a sense in which our robust decision 
rules are admissible in the statistical decision theoretic sense of being undominated. 
30  Christopher A. Sims has made this argument on several occasions. Why not learn the correct speciﬁcation?  17 
tion.  Throughout this book, whenever we consider changes in the economic 
environment,  we  imitate  rational expectations  policy  analysis  by  imputing 
common approximating models, one before the policy change, the other after, 
to all agents in the model and the econometrician (e.g., see chapter 14).  It 
is natural to doubt whether decision makers would fully trust their statistical 
models after such policy changes. 
1.12.  Why not learn the correct speciﬁcation? 
For much of this book, but not all, we attribute an enduring fear of misspeciﬁ­
cation to our decision maker. Wouldn’t it be more realistic to assume that the 
decision maker learns to detect and discard bad speciﬁcations as data accrue? 
One good answer to this question is related to some of the points made 
in  section  1.9.  In  chapter  9,  we  suggest  calibrating  the  free  parameter  θ 
borne by the “gentleman” in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1.1.1 so that, even 
with nondogmatic priors, it would take long time series to distinguish among 
the alternative speciﬁcations about which the decision maker is concerned. 
Because our decision maker discounts the future, he cannot avoid facing up 
to his model speciﬁcation doubts simply by waiting for enough data.31  Thus, 
one answer is that, relative to his discount factor, it would take a long time 
for him to learn not to fear model misspeciﬁcation. 
However,  we  agree that  it  is  wise  to  think  hard about  what  types  of 
misspeciﬁcation fears you can expect learning to dispel in a timely way, and 
which types you cannot.  But what are good ways to  learn when  you dis­
trust your model?  Chapters 17 and 18 are devoted to these issues.32  We 
present alternative formulations of robust estimation and ﬁltering problems 
and suggest ways to learn in the context of distrusted approximating models. 
Our approach allows us to distinguish types of model misspeciﬁcation fears 
that a decision maker can eventually escape by learning from types that he 
cannot.33 
31  As we shall see, one reason that it takes a very long data set to discriminate between 
the  models  that  concern  the  decision  maker  is  that  often  they  closely  approximate  each 
other  at  high  frequencies  and  diﬀer  mostly  at  very  low  frequencies.  Chapter  8  studies 
robustness from the viewpoint of the frequency domain. 
32  Also see Hansen and Sargent (2005b, 2007a, 2007b). 
33  Epstein and Schneider  (2006)  also make this distinction.  In the empirical model  of 
Hansen and Sargent (2007b), a representative consumer’s learning within the sample period 
reduces his doubts about the distribution of some unknown parameters, but does little to 
diminish his doubts about the distribution over diﬃcult to distinguish submodels, one of 
which confronts him with long-run risk in the growth rate of consumption. 18  Introduction 
1.13.  Is the set of perturbed models too limited? 
Parts  of  this  book  are  devoted  to  analyzing  situations  in  which  the  deci­
sion maker’s approximating model and the statistical perturbations to it that 
bother him all take the form of the stochastic linear evolution 
xt+1 = Axt + But + C ( t+1 + wt+1)  ( 1 .13.1) 
where xt  is a state vector, ut  a control vector,  t+1  an i.i.d. Gaussian shock 
with mean 0 and covariance I ,a n d  wt+1  is a vector of perturbations to the 
mean of   t+1 .  Under the approximating model,  wt+1  = 0, whereas under 
perturbed models,  wt+1  is allowed to be nonzero and to feed back on the 
history of past xt ’s. 
Some critics have voiced the complaint that this class of perturbations ex­
cludes types of misspeciﬁed dynamics that ought to concern a decision maker, 
such as unknown parameter values, misspecﬁcation of higher moments of the 
 t+1  distribution, and various kinds of “structured uncertainty.”  We think 
that this complaint is misplaced for the following reasons: 
1.	 For the problems with quadratic objective functions and approximating 
models like (1.13.1)  with wt+1 = 0, restricting ourselves to perturbations 
of the form (1.13.1) turns out not to be as restrictive as it might at ﬁrst 
seem.  In chapters 3 and 7, we permit a much wider class of alternative 
models that we formulate as absolutely continuous perturbations to the 
transition density  of state variables.  We show that when the decision 
maker’s objective function is quadratic and his approximating model is 
linear with Gaussian  t+1 , then he chooses a worst-case model that is of 
the form (1.13.1) with a C that is usually only slightly larger and a wt+1 
that is a linear function of  xt .  We shall explain why he makes little or 
no error by ignoring possible misspeciﬁcation of the volatility matrix C . 
2.  In  section  19.2  of  chapter  19,  we  show  how more  structured  kinds  of 
uncertainty can be accommodated by slightly reinterpreting the decision 
maker’s objective function. 
3.	 When the approximating model is a linear state evolution equation with 
Gaussian disturbances and the objective function is quadratic, worst case 
distributions are also jointly Gaussian. However, making the approximat­
ing model be non-Gaussian and non-linear or making the objective func­
tion be not quadratic leads to non-Gaussian worst-case joint probability 
distributions, as chapter 3 indicates. Fortunately, by extending the meth­
ods of chapters 17 and 18, as Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007a) do, we 
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models  with  non-Gaussian shock distributions while  making  decisions. 
The biggest hurdles in carrying out quantitative analyses like these are 
computational.  Most of the problems studied in this book are designed 
to be easy computationally by staying within a linear-quadratic-Gaussian 
setting.  But numerical methods allow us to tackle analogous problems 
outside the LQG setting.34 
1.14.  Is robust control theory positive or normative? 
Robust control and estimation theory has both normative and positive eco­
nomic applications.  In some contexts, we take our answer to question (2) in 
the preceding section to justify a positive statement about how people actually 
behave. For example, we use this interpretation when we apply robust control 
and estimation theory to study asset pricing puzzles by constructing a robust 
representative consumer whose marginal evaluations determine market prices 
of risk (see Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), Hansen, Sargent, and Wang 
(2002), and chapter 13). 
Monetary policy authorities and other decision makers ﬁnd themselves 
in situations where their desire to be cautious with respect to fears of model 
misspeciﬁcation would inspire them to use robust control and estimation tech­
niques.35  Normative uses of robust control theory occur often in engineering. 
1.15.  Other lessons 
Our research program of reﬁning typical rational expectations models to at­
tribute speciﬁcation doubts to the agents inside of them has broadened our 
own understanding of rational expectations  models  themselves.  Struggling 
with the ideas in this book has taught us much about the structure of re­
cursive models of economic equilibria,36  the relationship between control and 
estimation  problems,  and  Bayesian  interpretations  of  decision  rules  in  dy­
namic rational expectations models.  We shall use the macroeconomist’s Big 
K , little  k  trick with a vengeance. 
The 1950s-1960s control and estimation theories lampooned in the top 
panel of ﬁgure 1.1.1 have contributed enormously to the task of constructing 
dynamic equilibrium models in macroeconomics and other areas of applied 
economic dynamics.  We expect that the robust control theories represented 
34  See Cogley, Colacito, Hansen, and Sargent (2007) for an example. 
35  Blinder (1998)  expresses doubts  about  model  misspeciﬁcation that  he had when  he 
was vice chairman of the Federal Reserve System and how he coped with them. 
36  For  example,  see  chapter  12. 20  Introduction 
in the bottom panel of that ﬁgure will also bring many beneﬁts that we cannot 
anticipate. 
1.16.  Topics and organization 
This monograph displays alternative ways to express and respond to a deci­
sion maker’s doubts about model speciﬁcation.  We study both control and 
estimation (or ﬁltering) problems, and both single- and multiple-agent set­
tings.  As already mentioned, we adapt and extend results from the robust 
control literature in two important ways.  First, unlike the control literature, 
which focuses on undiscounted problems, we formulate discounted problems. 
Incorporating discounting involves substantial work, especially in chapter 8, 
and requires paying special attention to initial conditions. Second, we analyze 
three types of economic environments with multiple decision makers who are 
concerned about model misspeciﬁcation:  (1) a competitive equilibrium with 
complete markets in history-date contingent claims and a representative agent 
who fears model misspeciﬁcation (chapters 12 and 13); (2) a Markov perfect 
equilibrium of a dynamic game with multiple decision makers who fear model 
misspeciﬁcation (chapter 15);  and (3) a Stackelberg or Ramsey problem in 
which the leader fears model misspeciﬁcation (chapter 16).  Thinking about 
model misspeciﬁcation in these environments requires that we introduce an 
equilibrium concept that extends rational expectations.  We stay mostly, but 
not exclusively, within a linear-quadratic framework, in which a pervasive cer­
tainty equivalence principle allows a nonstochastic presentation of most of the 
control and ﬁltering theory. 
This book is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 summarizes a set of prac­
tical  results  at  a  relatively  nontechnical  level.  A  message  of  this  chapter 
is that although sophisticated arguments from chapters 7 and 8 are needed 
fully  to  justify  the techniques  of  robust control,  the  techniques  themselves 
are as easy to apply as the ordinary dynamic programming techniques that 
are now widely used throughout macroeconomics and applied general equi­
librium theory. Chapter 2 uses linear-quadratic dynamic problems to convey 
this message, but the message applies more generally, as we shall illustrate in 
chapter 3.  Chapter 3 tells how the key ideas about robustness generalize to 
models that are not linear quadratic. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are about optimal control and ﬁltering when the deci­
sion maker trusts his model. These chapters contain a variety of useful results 
for characterizing the linear dynamic systems that are widely used in macroe­
conomics.  Chapter 4 sets forth important principles by summarizing results 
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the survey by Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) and culmi­
nates in a description of invariant subspace methods for solving linear optimal 
control and ﬁltering problems and also for solving dynamic linear equilibrium 
models. Later chapters apply these methods to various problems: to compute 
robust decision rules as solutions of two-player zero-sum games; to compute 
robust ﬁlters via another two-player zero-sum game; and to compute equilib­
ria of robust Stackelberg or Ramsey problems in macroeconomics. Chapter 5 
emphasizes that the Kalman ﬁlter is the dual (in a sense familiar to economists 
from their use of Lagrange multipliers) of the basic linear-quadratic dynamic 
programming problem of chapter 4 and sets the stage for a related duality 
result for a robust ﬁltering problem to be presented in chapter 17. 
The remaining chapters are about making wise decisions when a decision 
maker distrusts his model. Within a one-period setting, chapter 6 introduces 
two-player zero-sum games as a way to induce robust decisions.  Although 
the forms of model misspeciﬁcations considered in this chapter are very sim­
ple relative to those considered in subsequent chapters, the static setting of 
chapter 6 is a good one for addressing some important conceptual issues.  In 
particular, in this chapter we state multiplier and constraint problems, two 
diﬀerent two-player zero-sum games that induce robust decision rules. We use 
the Lagrange multiplier theorem to connect the problems. 
Chapters 7 and 8 extend and modify results in the control literature to for­
mulate robust control problems with discounted quadratic objective functions 
and linear transition laws.  Chapter 7 represents things in the time domain, 
while chapter 8 works in the frequency domain.  Incorporating discounting 
requires carefully restating the control problems used to induce robust deci­
sion rules. Chapters 7 and 8 describe two ways to alter the discounted linear 
quadratic optimal control problem in a way to induce robust decision rules: 
(1) to form one of several two-player zero-sum games in which nature chooses 
from a set of models in a way that makes the decision maker want robust de­
cision rules; and (2) to adjust the continuation value function in the dynamic 
program in a way that encodes the decision maker’s preference for a robust 
rule.  The continuation value that works comes from the minimization piece 
of one of the two-player zero-sum games in (1).  In category (1), we present 
a detailed account of several two-player zero-sum games with diﬀerent timing 
protocols, each of which induces a robust decision rule. As an extension of cat­
egory (2), we present three speciﬁcations of preferences that express concerns 
about model misspeciﬁcation.  Two of them are expressed in the frequency 
domain:  the  H∞  and entropy criteria.  The entropy objective function sum­
marizes model speciﬁcation doubts with a single parameter. That parameter 
relates to a Lagrange multiplier in a two-player zero-sum constraint game, and 22  Introduction 
also to the risk-sensitivity parameter of Jacobson (1973) and Whittle (1990), 
as modiﬁed for discounting by Hansen and Sargent (1995). 
Chapters  7  and  8  show  how  robustness  is  induced  by  using  max-min 
strategies:  the decision maker maximizes while nature minimizes over a set 
of models that are close to the approximating model.  There are alternative 
timing protocols in terms of which a two-player zero-sum game can be cast. 
A main ﬁnding of chapter 7 is that zero-sum games that make a variety of 
diﬀerent timing protocols share outcomes and representations of equilibrium 
strategies.  This important result lets us use recursive methods to compute 
our  robust rules and also facilitates computing equilibria  in multiple-agent 
economics. 
Arthur Goldberger and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., warned applied economists 
to beware of theorists bearing free parameters (see ﬁgure 1.1.1).  Relative to 
settings in which decision makers completely trust their models, the multiplier 
and constraint problems of chapters 7 and 8 each bring one new free parameter 
that expresses a concern about model misspeciﬁcation,  θ  for the multiplier 
problem and η for the constraint problem. Each of these parameters measures 
sets of models near the approximating model against which the decision maker 
seeks a robust rule.  Chapter 9 proposes a way to calibrate these parameters 
by using the statistical theory for discriminating models.37  We apply this 
theory in chapters 10 and 14. 
Chapter 10 uses the permanent income model of consumption as a labo­
ratory for illustrating some of the concepts from chapters 7 and 8. Because he 
prefers smooth consumption paths, the permanent income consumer’s savings 
are designed to attenuate the eﬀects of income ﬂuctuations on his consump­
tion.  A robust consumer engages in a kind of precautionary savings because 
he suspects error in the speciﬁcation of the income process.  We will also use 
the model of chapter 10 as a laboratory for asset pricing in chapter 13.  But 
ﬁrst, chapters 11 and 12 describe how to decentralize the solution of a plan­
ning problem with a competitive equilibrium.  Chapter 11 sets out a class of 
dynamic economies and describes two decentralizations, one with trading of 
history-date contingent commodities once and for all at time zero, another 
with  sequential  trading  of  one-period  Arrow  securities.  In  that  sequential 
setting, we give a recursive representation of equilibrium prices.  Chapter 11 
describes a setting where the representative agent has no concern about model 
misspeciﬁcation, while chapter 12 extends the characterizations of chapter 11 
to situations where the representative decision maker fears model misspeciﬁ­
cation. 
Chapter 13 builds on the chapter 12 results to show how fear of model 
37  See Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003). Topics and organization  23 
misspeciﬁcation aﬀects asset pricing.  We show how, from the vantage point 
of the approximating model, a concern for robustness induces a multiplicative 
adjustment to the stochastic discount factor.  The adjustment measures the 
representative consumer’s fear that the approximating model is misspeciﬁed. 
The adjustment for robustness resembles ones that ﬁnancial economists use 
to construct risk neutral probability measures for pricing assets. We describe 
the basic theory within a class of linear quadratic general equilibrium models 
and then a calibrated version of the permanent income model of chapter 10. 
A  remarkable observational equivalence  result identiﬁes  a  locus  of  pairs of 
discount factors and robustness multipliers, all of which imply identical real 
allocations.38  Nevertheless,  prices of risky assets vary substantially across 
these pairs.  In chapter 14, we revisit some quantitative ﬁndings of Tallarini 
(2000) and reinterpret asset pricing patterns that he imputed to very high risk 
aversion in terms of a plausible fear of model misspeciﬁcation.  We measure 
a plausible fear of misspeciﬁcation by using the detection error probabilities 
introduced in chapter 9. 
Chapters 15 and 16 describe two more settings with multiple decision 
makers and introduce an equilibrium concept that extends rational expecta­
tions in what we think is a natural way. In a rational expectations equilibrium, 
all decision makers completely trust a common model.  Important aspects of 
that common model, those governing endogenous state variables, are equilib­
rium outcomes.  The source of the powerful cross-equation restrictions that 
are the hallmark of rational expectations econometrics is that decision makers 
share a common model and that this model governs the data.39  To preserve 
that empirical power in an equilibrium with multiple decision makers who fear 
model misspeciﬁcation, we impose that all decision makers share a common 
approximating model.40  The model components that describe endogenous 
state variables are equilibrium outcomes that depend on agents’ robust deci­
sion making processes, i.e., on the solutions to their max-min problems. 
Chapter 15 describes how to implement this equilibrium concept in the 
context of a two-player dynamic game in which the players share a common 
38  This result establishes a precise sense in which, so far as real quantities are concerned, 
increased fear of model misspecﬁciation acts just like reduced  discounting of the future, so 
that its eﬀects on real quantities can be oﬀset by increasing t h er a t ea t  w h i c h  f u t u r e  p a y o ﬀ s 
are discounted. 
39  The restriction that  they share a common model is the feature that  makes free pa­
rameters governing expectations disappear.  This is what legitimizes a law of large numbers 
that underlies rational expectations econometrics. 
40  In the empirical applications of Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Anderson, 
Hansen,  and Sargent (2003),  we also maintain the second aspect of rational expectations 
modeling, namely, that the decision makers’ approximating model actually does  generate 
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approximating model and each player makes robust decisions by solving a two-
player zero-sum game, taking the approximating model as given.  We show 
how to compute the approximating model by solving pairs of robust versions of 
the Bellman equations and ﬁrst-order conditions for the two decision makers. 
While the equilibrium imposes a common approximating model, the worst-
case models of the two decision makers diﬀer because their objectives diﬀer. 
In this sense, the model produces endogenous ex post heterogeneity of beliefs. 
In chapter 16, we alter the timing protocol to study a control problem, 
called a Ramsey problem, where a leader wants optimally to control followers 
who  are  forecasting  the  leader’s  controls.  We  describe  how  to  compute  a 
robust Stackelberg policy when the Stackelberg leader can commit to a rule. 
We accomplish that by using a robust version of the optimal linear regulator 
or else one of the invariant subspace methods of chapter 4. 
Chapter 17 extends the analysis of ﬁltering from chapter 5 by describing 
a robust ﬁltering problem that is dual to the control problem of chapter 7.41 
This recursive ﬁltering problem requires that a time  t  decision maker must 
respect  distortions  to  the  distribution  of  the  hidden  state  that  he  inherits 
from past decision makers.  As a consequence, in this problem, bygones are 
not bygones:42  the decision makers concerns about past  returns aﬀect his 
estimate of the current value of a hidden state vector. 
Chapter 18 uses a diﬀerent criterion than chapter 17 and ﬁnds a diﬀerent 
robust ﬁlter.  We think that the chapter 18 ﬁlter is the appropriate one for 
many problems and give some examples. The diﬀerent ﬁlters that emerge from 
chapters 17 and 18 illustrate how robust decision rules are ‘context speciﬁc’ 
in the sense that they depend on the common objective function in the two-
player  zero-sum  game  that  is  used  to  induce  a  robust  decision  rule.  This 
theme will run through this book. 
Chapter  19  concludes  by  confronting  some of  the  conﬁning  aspects  of 
our work, some criticisms that we have heard, and opportunities for further 
progress. 
41  We originally found this problem by stating and solving a conjugate problem of a kind 
familiar to economists through duality theory.  By faithfully following where duality leads, 
we discovered a ﬁltering problem that is peculiar (but not necessarily uninteresting) from 
an economic standpoint.  A sketch of this argument is presented in appendix A of chapter 
17. 
42  But see the epigraph from William Stanley Jevons quoted at the start of chapter 18. 